# 1NC

## 1st off

#### First the links, Production focus to problems fails—the only solutions it engenders are more production

Princen et al, 2002

[Thomas, Ph.D., Political Economy and Government, 1988, Harvard University and Associate professor at the Univ. of Michigan school of natural resources and environment, Michael Maniates, Professor of Political and Environmental Science at Allegheny College, and Ken Conca, Program Director the School of Global Environmental Politics at American University, Confronting Consumption, “Confronting Consumption.” Pg. 1-20. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

Combining the elements of socially embedded consumers and linked chains of resource-use decisions leads to a third theme of our provisional framework: that ‘‘consuming’’ occurs all along the chain, not just at the downstream node of consumer demand. Nodes of raw-material extraction and manufacturing, for example, represent not just production and value added, but also consumption and value subtracted. Producers are consumers; production is consumption. An important implication of this idea is that what is being consumed at each node is not obvious. At the node of primary resource extraction it might be the tree or the fish, or it might be the ecosystem integrity of the forest or the fishery. At the node of final purchase it might be an apple, or a person’s attention, or a community’s social fabric. Another implication of this view is that responsibility shifts from the individuated consumers-as-final-demanders to actors at all nodes of the chain. Producers may add value as they satisfy downstream demand, but they also risk value depletion; they consume value by producing. In using up resources both natural and social, they impose costs on the environment and on people— be they purchasers, workers, caregivers, neighbors, or citizens. This consumption angle on resource use offers a corrective to the production-centered perspective that dominates contemporary discussions of economic affairs, including environmental protection. In that perspective, raw materials feed manufacturing and distribution to produce what people want. It follows that, because goods are good and would not be produced if people did not want them, more goods— and more production— must be better. A productive economy is, as a result, one that produces more goods for a given input (thus increasing the economy’s ‘‘productivity’’), yields more choices for consumers, and increases output. When production creates problems such as pollution, the productive answer is to produce correctives such as scrubbers, filters, and detoxifiers. So goes the logic of production, productiveness, productivity, and products— construing all things economic as producing, as adding value, as, indeed, progress. The consumption angle turns this around to self-consciously construe economic activity as consuming, as depleting value, as risking ecological overshoot, as stressing social capacity.

#### The impact to the mass consumption politics of the affirmative is planetary destruction, loss of value to life, and mass poverty and dehumanization—the alternative’s criticism of consumption is key to ethical engagement with the planet

Alexander, 2011

[Samuel, University of Melbourne Office for Environmental Programs and Simplicity Institute, Voluntary Simplicity as an Aesthetics of Existence, Online] /Wyo-MB

As noted in the introduction, consumption presents itself as an area of ethical concern in at least three ways: first, because Western-­‐style consumption is putting an immense and unsustainable burden on the planet’s ecosystems, so much so that contemporary cultures of consumption are diminishing the capacity of the planet to support life as we know it in the future;50 second, because the high consumption, resource-­‐intensive lifestyles enjoyed by most people in the richest nations coexist in a world where great multitudes live lives oppressed by material deprivation;51 and thirdly, because there is a large and growing body of sociological and psychological literature indicating that once our basic material needs for food, shelter, clothing, etc. are met, the limitless pursuit of more money and possessions neither produces any lasting happiness nor satisfies the human need for meaning.52 Far from representing the peak of civilization, cultures of mass consumption are showing distinct signs of widespread social, even spiritual, malaise.53 Any one of these issues, it could be argued, would be sufficient for consumption to become a proper subject for ethical engagement, in the Foucauldian sense of ethics as ‘the self engaging the self.’ When the three issues are considered together, the case for ethical engagement is compelling. At once, however, we are confronted with a strange incongruity, even a contradiction, of sorts, one that seems to tear the present analysis apart. In an age when the facts of ecological degradation, extreme poverty, and consumer malaise lie quite plainly before our eyes, one might have thought that First World consumption practices were already a subject of widespread ethical engagement. That is, one might have expected consumption practices to be a domain of constant and dedicated ethical attention, given that overconsumption seems to be driving several of the world’s most pressing problems (including the problem of consumer malaise). And yet, it can hardly be denied that any ethical engagement that takes place within consumer cultures does not, as a rule, seek to reduce or moderate consumption but rather encourage, glorify, and increase consumption – and increase it without apparent limit.54 And here is the contradiction: consumption is at once an extremely obvious realm for ethical engagement, for the three reasons stated above, and, at the same time, engaging the self by the self for the purpose of deliberately reducing or moderating consumption seems to be more or less unthinkable within modern consumer societies. Indeed, there seems to be an almost unquestioned assumption throughout consumer societies that consumption practices are somehow ‘beyond ethics,’ in the sense that how much we consume does not really need to inform the answer we give to the question of ‘how one ought to live.’ On the contrary, it is presumed that everyone is justified seeking as high a material standard of living as possible, a pursuit that is limited, it would seem, only by the laws of a free market economy.

#### The alternative is to reject the production based approach of the affirmative in favor of the 1NC criticism of consumption.

#### The purpose of debate should be to fashion ourselves, the alternative opens up space for ethical engagement with the problem of consumption and the embrace of voluntary simplicity, this changes our subjectivity as consumers

Alexander, 2011

[Samuel, University of Melbourne Office for Environmental Programs and Simplicity Institute, Voluntary Simplicity as an Aesthetics of Existence, Online] /Wyo-MB

 The aim of this paper, however, is not to present a thorough analysis of Foucault’s notion of an aesthetics of existence. Several such analyses have appeared in recent times (after years of unfortunate scholarly neglect), and much of this emerging commentary is very probing and insightful.12 But this is not the time to focus on furthering that critical discussion or even providing a comprehensive literature review of it. Instead, after providing a brief exposition of Foucault’s ethics, this paper will undertake to actually apply the idea of an aesthetics of existence to a particular subject of ethical concern, namely, to our role as ‘consumers’ in the context of First World overconsumption. This is an area that raises ethical questions concerning how we ought to live for two main reasons: firstly, due to the impact Western-­‐style consumers are having on the natural environment; and secondly, due to the continued existence of poverty amidst plenty. There is, however, another perspective to consider also. A large body of sociological and psychological literature now exists indicating that Western-­‐style consumption practices are often failing to provide meaning and fulfillment, even to those who have ‘succeeded’ in attaining a high material standard of living.13 These three consumption-­‐related issues – ecological degradation, poverty amidst plenty, and consumer malaise – provide ample grounds for thinking that consumption is a proper subject for ethical engagement, in the Foucauldian sense of ethics as ‘the self engaging the self.’ If it is the case that our individual identities have been shaped, insidiously perhaps, by a social system that celebrates and encourages consumption without apparent limit – and it would not be unfair to describe consumer societies in these terms14 – then it may be that ethical practice today calls for a rethinking of our assumptions and attitudes concerning consumption, which might involve a deliberate reshaping of the self by the self. This paper will explore the possibility of such an ethics of consumption in the following ways. First, by explaining how neoclassical economics, which is arguably the most influential paradigm of thought in the world today, conceptualizes consumption as something that benefits both ‘self’ and ‘other’ and, therefore, as something that should be maximized. To the extent that modern consumers have internalized this conception of consumption, an ethics of consumption might involve engaging the self for the purpose of changing the self and creating something new. The second way an ethics of consumption will be explored will be through an examination of the theory and practice of ‘voluntary simplicity,’ a term that refers to an oppositional living strategy or ‘way of life’ with which people, somewhat paradoxically, perhaps, seek an increased quality of life through a reduction and restraint of one’s level of consumption.15 The paradox, so-­‐ called, consists in the attempt to live ‘more with less.’ Since voluntarily living simply means heading in the opposite direction to where most people in consumer societies (and increasingly elsewhere) seem to want to go, one would expect living simply to require a fundamentally creative engagement with life and culture, especially in contemporary consumer societies that seem to be predicated on the assumption that ‘more consumption is always better.’ This need for a fundamentally creative engagement with life is what prompted the present attempt to elucidate the idea of ‘voluntary simplicity as aesthetics of existence,’ and it is this attempt to infuse Foucauldian ethics with an emerging post-­‐consumerist philosophy of life that constitutes the original contribution of this paper. It is hoped that this practical application of Foucault’s ethics might also prompt others to consider how ethical engagement might produce new ways of being that are freer, more fulfilling, and yet less resource-­‐intensive and damaging than the modes of being which are dominant in consumer societies today. Could it be, for example, that the ‘Death of Man,’ to use Foucault’s phrase, was actually the first (and a necessary) phase in the demise of what one might call ‘homo consumicus’? And what forms of life, what modes of being, would or could materialize with the voluntary emergence of ‘homo post-­‐consumicus’? These are the large questions that motivated this study and in the following pages a preliminary attempt is made to grapple with them. The aim, however, is not to legitimate ‘what is already known,’16 since that would not be a very Foucauldian endeavor; rather, the aim is to explore whether or to what extent it is possible to ‘free thought from what it silently thinks,’17 in the hope that this might open up space to ‘think differently,’18 to think otherwise.

## 2nd off

#### Text: The United States Department of Defense should increase loan guarantees for Liquid fluoride thorium reactors in the United States.

#### Light Water Reactors cause accidents—spent fuel pools, cause fires and leaks that harm the environment

Alvarez, 2002

[Robert, senior policy adviser in the Energy Department and is now a senior scholar at the Institute for Policy Studies, “What about the spent fuel?” Bulletin of Atomic scientists, 58.1, 45-47, Accessed online via proquest] /Wyo-MB

UNTIL RECENTLY, CONCERNS ABOUT ATTACKS on commercial nuclear power plants focused mainly on the vulnerability of reactor containment buildings. But nuclear power plants may have a weaker link-spent fuel ponds. "Reactors are inside steel vessels surrounded by heavy structures and containment buildings," says Gordon Thompson, senior scientist at the Institute for Resource and Security Studies. "Spent fuel pools, containing some of the largest concentrations of radioactivity on the planet, can catch fire and are in much more vulnerable buildings." Public officials share Thompson's concern. "I'm not so worried about the core; I'm worried about the spent fuel pool," Gov. Howard Dean of Vermont told the New York Times (November 2). "There's basically no protection there." The ponds, typically rectangular or L-shaped basins about 40 feet deep, are made of reinforced concrete walls four to five feet thick and stainless steel liners. Basins without steel liners are more susceptible to cracks and corrosion. Most of the spent fuel ponds at boiling water reactors are housed in reactor buildings several stories above ground. Pools at pressurized water reactors-representing about two-thirds of all ponds-are partially or fully embedded in the ground, sometimes above tunnels or underground rooms. Fire and water Over the past 25 years, Thompson, a physicist and engineer, has worked on behalf of citizen groups and state and local governments to convince nuclear regulators in the United States and Europe that spent fuel pools pose severe risks. The most serious risk, he says, is loss of the pool water that cools and shields the highly radioactive spent fuel assemblies. Water loss could expose spent fuel, leading to a catastrophic fire with consequences potentially worse than a reactor meltdown. Most U.S. reactors store spent fuel in high-density pools. If that fuel were exposed to air and steam, the zirconium cladding would react exothermically, catching fire at about 1,000 degrees Celsius. A fuel pond building would probably not survive, and the fire would likely spread to nearby pools. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concedes that such a fire cannot be extinguished; it could rage for days. On average, spent fuel ponds hold five to 10 times more long-lived radioactivity than a reactor core. Particularly worrisome is the large amount of cesium 137 in fuel ponds, which contain anywhere from 20 to 50 million curies of this dangerous isotope. With a half-life of 30 years, cesium 137 gives off highly penetrating radiation and is absorbed in the food chain as if it were potassium. According to the NRC, as much as 100 percent of a pool's cesium 137 would be released into the environment in a fire. In comparison, the 1986 Chernobyl accident released about 40 percent of the reactor core's 6 million curies of cesium 137 into the atmosphere, resulting in massive off-site radiation exposures. A single spent fuel pond holds more cesium 137 than was deposited by all atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in the Northern Hemisphere combined. If a fire were to break out at the Millstone Reactor Unit 3 spent fuel pond in Connecticut, it would result in a three-fold increase in background exposures. This level triggers the NRC's evacuation requirement, and could render about 29,000 square miles of land uninhabitable, according to Thompson. Connecticut covers only about 5,000 square miles; an accident at Millstone could severely affect Long Island and even New York City. A 1997 report for the NRC by Brookhaven National Laboratory also found that a severe pool fire could render about 188 square miles uninhabitable, cause as many as 28,000 cancer fatalities, and cost $59 billion in damage. (The Brookhaven study relied on a different standard of uninhabitability than Thompson.) While estimates vary, "the use of a little imagination," says Thompson, "shows that a pool fire would be a regional and national disaster of historic proportions." Several events could cause a loss of pool water, including leakage, evaporation, siphoning, pumping, aircraft impact, earthquake, accidental or deliberate drop of a fuel transport cask, reactor failure, or an explosion inside or outside the pool building. Industry officials maintain that personnel would have sufficient time to provide an alternative cooling system before the spent fuel caught fire. But if the water level dropped to just a few feet above the spent fuel, the radiation doses in the pool building would be lethal. The procedures fuel handlers need to follow to recognize problems, repair heavily damaged equipment, and command off-site resources have yet to be formalized, much less tested. But if routine operations are any indication, not all reactors would pass muster: By the NRC's own admission, significant temperature rises in fuel ponds have gone undetected for days.

#### NUCLEAR MELTDOWN WILL DESTROY ALL LIFE

**WASSERMAN 2002**

[Harvey, enior advisor to Greenpeace USA and the Nuclear Information & Resource Service “Nuclear Power and Terrorism,” Earth island Journal Spring 2002 Vol. 17, No.1//delo-uwyo]

As **at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps, natural ecosystems would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed.** Spiritually, psychologically, **financially and ecologically, our nation would never recover. This is what we missed by a mere 40 miles on September 11**. Now that we are at war, this is what could be happening as you read this. **There are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse operating in the US.** They generate a mere 8 percent of our total energy. Since its deregulation crisis, California cut its electric consumption by some 15 percent. Within a year, the US could cheaply replace virtually all the reactors with increased efficiency. Yet, as the terror escalates, Congress is fast-tracking the extension of the Price-Anderson Act, a form of legal immunity that protects reactor operators from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist attack. Do we take this war seriously**? Are we committed to the survival of our nation? If so, the ticking reactor bombs that could obliterate the very core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.**

## 3rd off

#### Will pass, top of Obama agenda

Joseph Pimentel, Asian Journal, Proponents of comprehensive immigration reform hope for resolution in August, 2/15/2013

LOS ANGELES – Pro-immigration advocates are hopeful that the government will pass a comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) legislation by August, giving relief to the more than 11 million undocumented individuals in the United States.¶ During a New America Media national telebriefing: Tracking Immigration Reform in 2013 on Thursday, proponents of CIR believe this is the year – and have set August as its target date - that reform legislation has to pass or the issue may languish again.¶ “That is an ambitious timeline but I believe I think it’s one that is possible,” said Angela Kelley, vice president for Immigration Policy and Advocacy, Center for American Progress.¶ “Those of us who have been fighting for reform for all these years, it is one that we must push and frankly, demand. Time is not our friend. The closer you get to the end of the year, the harder it is to get (Senate and House of Representative) members to do anything,” Kelley added.¶ Comprehensive immigration reform has been a polarizing issue, mired in Washington politics for years with both sides unable to get anything done. This year it appeared CIR would once again take a backseat as other issues like gun control, and the economy have been placed on top.¶ Heading into his second term, President Barack Obama has placed immigration reform on top of his agenda -- doing a speech about the issue in Las Vegas and mentioning it again during his State of the Union address.¶ “We know what needs to be done,” said Obama during his state of the union speech. “As we speak, bipartisan groups in both chambers are working diligently to draft a bill, and I applaud their efforts. Now let’s get this done. Send me a comprehensive immigration reform bill in the next few months, and I will sign it right away.”¶ Obama is looking at his legacy and leading the charge on this issue, said Kelley.¶

#### PC key to keep both sides at the table-healthcare reform fight proves

Sink Feb. 19th

[Justin Sink, Feb. 19th, 2013, Obama seeks to repair rift with Republicans on immigration reform, http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/283877-obama-seeks-to-repair-rift-with-with-gop-on-immigration#ixzz2LazOnYVM ,uwyo//amp]

A senior Democratic congressional aide close to the bipartisan immigration talks downplayed the criticism from Rubio and other Republicans about the leaked White House bill. The aide suggested it was all part of the complicated political dance that must take place to keep both liberals and conservatives at the table on immigration reform. “I don’t think it hurts the process at all,” the aide said. “It shows the president is serious, and he’s not going to wait forever for Congress to act.” The White House in recent weeks has made a public show of demonstrating that it has learned the lessons of its fight for healthcare reform in 2009. Then, Obama faced criticism for allowing bipartisan Senate talks to drag on for too long, wasting political momentum and allowing opposition to escalate into a firestorm. Now, the White House has offered repeated public reminders that it is prepared to submit its own bill if Congress dawdles, and the leak of parts of it over the weekend could serve as a spur for that process.“I wouldn’t say we were surprised” by the leak, the Democratic aide said. The aide did voice regret that the published proposal did not encompass the entirety of the principles Obama has laid out on immigration reform, which include enhancements to border security and reforms to the legal immigration system. “It’s unfortunate that only a piece of it was leaked out,” the aide said. Janet Murguía, head of the National Council of La Raza, an Hispanic civil-rights group, said there’s “some legitimacy” to Rubio’s criticisms of Obama. But she was quick to add that it’s also “legitimate and appropriate” for the president to remind lawmakers that he’ll push his own reforms if Congress fails to reach a deal on its own. She characterized the partisan barbs as “healthy tensions” that put pressure on both sides to secure comprehensive reforms this year.

#### Nuclear power has significant opposition – public and congressional

Andrew Freedman, Editor and Senior Science writer for Climate Central, “Feds Approve First Nuclear Reactors Since 1970s”, Climatecentral.org, February 9th, 2012.

By a v ote of 4 to 1 , the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approv ed the construction of the first new nuclear reactors to be built in the United States since 1 97 8. The reactors would be built at the Vogtle power plant near Way nesboro, Ga., which is a nuclear power plant operated by the Southern Company . As The Hill's E-2 Wire blog noted, the lone dissenting v ote was cast by NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko. The nuclear industry has faced numerous obstacles, most recently the backlash following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, in its efforts to build new nuclear plants in the U.S., and the Commission has issued recommendations on how to better protect U.S. reactors from earthquakes and floods. The country currently operates 1 04 nuclear reactors, but all were approv ed at least three decades ago. “This is a historic day,” said Marv in Fertel, president of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry ’s trade group in a statement. “Today’s licensing action sounds a clarion call to the world that the United States recognizes the importance of expanding nuclear energy as a key component of a low-carbon energy future that is central to job creation, div ersity of electricity supply and energy security .” Andrew Restuccia, writing for The Hill, noted the project still needs to overcome public opposition to nuclear power that may result in a lawsuit against the project, and congressional opposition to a hefty $8.3 billion federal conditional loan guarantee for reactor construction. "Some Democrats in Congress — noting that the loan guarantee is more than 1 5 times the size of the one granted to the failed solar firm Solyndra — have called on Obama not to finalize the loan." “Ithink we are putting our taxpayer money at unnecessary risk given the unresolved safety issues and the lessons that hav e been learned from Fukushima,” Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), a senior Democrat on the House Energy and Commerce Committee and a v ocal critic of nuclear power, told The Hill Wednesday . The Obama administration has supported the dev elopment of new nuclear power plants as a way to reduce greenhouse

gas emissons and cut the use of fossil fuels.

#### Critical to US economic recovery

Aaron Terrazas, Migration Policy Institute, July 2011, The Economic Integration of Immigrants in the United States: Long- and Short-Term Perspectives, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/EconomicIntegration.pdf

The fate of immigrants in the United States and their integration into the labor market are impossible to separate from the state of the overall US economy and the fate of all US workers. During periods of economic expansion and relative prosperity, upward economic mobility among the native born generates opportunities for immigrants to gain a foothold in the US labor market and to gradually improve their status over time. In many respects, a growing economy during the 1990s and early 2000s provided ample opportunity for immigrants — and especially their children — to gradually improve their status over time. However, the story of immigrants’ integration into the US labor force during the years leading to the recession was also mixed: In general, the foreign born had high labor force participation, but they were also more likely to occupy low-paying jobs. The most notable advances toward economic integration occur over generations, due in large part to the openness of US educational institutions to the children of immigrants and the historic lack of employment discrimination against workers with an immigrant background. In the wake of the global economic crisis, there is substantial uncertainty regarding the future trajectory of the US economy and labor market. Most forecasts suggest that the next decade will be substantially different from the past26 and it is not clear if previous trends in immigrants’ economic integration will continue. The recession, weak recovery, and prospect of prolonged stagnation as a result of continuing high public debt, could realign the economic and social forces that have historically propelled the the less-educated labor force have been dismal for decades. In some respects, the recession accelerated these trends. While the prospect of greater demand for US manufactured goods from emerging markets might slow gradual decay of the US manufacturing industry, the outlook for the industry remains weak. Steady educational gains throughout the developing world have simultaneously increased downward wage pressure on highly skilled workers who, in the past, generated substantial secondary demand for services that immigrants often provide.

**Economic decline causes protectionism and war – their defense doesn’t assume accompanying shifts in global power.**

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess5 (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘**D**iversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

## 4th off

#### Steel industry on the brink

Tweh 1/4

[Bowdeta, Correspondent for NWI Times, “U.S. steel production up 3 percent in '12” 1.4.2013. < http://www.nwitimes.com/business/local/u-s-steel-production-up-percent-in/article\_6f94a9a4-ac60-52f5-8818-e290eef54aa6.html>//wyo-hdm]

Production of raw steel in the United States is expected to have increased about 3 percent in 2012 from a year earlier, according to early estimates from the American Iron and Steel Institute. Thomas Gibson, president and CEO of the Washington-based trade association representing the interests of the North American steel industry, said steel production last year is expected to grow for the fourth consecutive year. Domestic mills produced 95.2 million tons of raw steel in 2011. Apparent U.S. steel consumption is expected to have risen 3.7 percent to 110 million tons in 2012. "Steel is doing a little bit better than the economy as a whole, but it's still a fragile recovery," Gibson said. However, the 2012 level remains less than the 100 million-ton mark exceeded in each year between 2002 and 2008. During those seven years, the average capacity utilization rate was 87.4 percent. Finished steel imports represented about 24 percent of the domestic steel market, according to an AISI analysis of U.S. Department of Commerce steel import permit applications.

#### High prices of nuclear power means investors will pass on low natural gas prices in order to maximize profit – the costs gets put on taxpayers because of advanced cost recovery

Cooper 3/19/12 (Mark, Senior Fellow for Economic Analysis, Institute for Energy and the Environment - Vermont Law School, "Nuclear Power," http://iowa.sierraclub.org/Nuclear/nuclearhome.htm)

The effort by the Senate Commerce Committee to put a consumer protection band aid over a high caliber bullet hole in the heart of traditional ratepayer protection only makes the absurdity of the early cost recovery for nuclear reactors even more apparent.¶ Because the bill removes nuclear power from “traditional ratemaking principles or traditional cost recovery mechanisms,” consumer bills will increase dramatically. As passed out of Committee:¶ · Mid-American customers will be forced to pay for nuclear reactors long before they produce any electricity with no hope of recovering those prepayments should the reactors not be completed.¶ · The IUB is not allowed to reject the utility-determined level of prepayments because there are less costly alternatives available.¶ · Although the risk of building and operating a nuclear reactor is shifted to ratepayers, the utility is guaranteed a rate of return that will be higher than it earns on other projects.¶ This mismatch of risk and reward gives the utility strong incentives to maximize profits at the expense of ratepayers and strips the Utility Board of the powers necessary to protect ratepayers. Notwithstanding the amendments, the harmful effects identified by the Staff of the Utility Board in the original bill are still in place.¶ · By conferring a special advantage on nuclear, it threatens to distort the utility and regulatory decision making process and gives utilities an incentive to choose investments and make construction decisions that harm ratepayers.¶ · Beyond the initial choice of projects, shifting the risk of nuclear reactor construction onto the backs of ratepayers creates an ongoing problem because it diminishes the incentive to drive a hard bargain with vendors that protects ratepayers or recover costs from joint owners.¶ · By excusing nuclear reactors from rigorous comparative analysis of alternatives, it all but guarantees less costly alternatives will be passed over.¶ · Because nuclear reactors are so risky and impossible to finance in normal capital market, the utilities are pushing for advanced and guaranteed recovery of all costs, but certainty denies regulators the flexibility that is needed in an uncertain and rapidly changing environment and ties the hands of the IUB in its efforts to balance the interest of ratepayers and utility shareholders.¶ · The need to accelerate cost recovery creates severe intergenerational inequities in cost recovery, violating the fundamental principle that those who consume the output of a plant should bear its costs.¶ · Having guaranteed utilities cost recovery on an annual basis, the IUB will be under greater pressure to approve “incremental” additions to cost even when those costs are the result of utility error.¶ In its press release, MidAmerican trumpets the fact that “MidAmerican Energy Iowa’s electric customers have enjoyed stable base electricity rates for 16 years” and takes credit for that accomplishment. It conveniently ignores the important role that traditional ratemaking principles and traditional cost recovery mechanism have played in ensuring utilities deliver least cost power. By excusing the most risky, high cost options available today from those principles, this bill destroys the consumer protections that have produced stable rates in the past. The inevitable result will be that the future rates paid by MidAmerican electricity customers will be higher than they could and should be.

#### Low electricity prices are key to the steel industry

IHS 11

(IHS Global Insight - leading economic analysis and forecasting firm, December 2011, "The Economic and Employment Contributions of Shale Gas in the United States," anga.us/media/235626/shale-gas-economic-impact-dec-2011.pdf)

Energy from electricity or natural gas makes up a higher proportion of the value of iron ore processed¶ from taconite in the Great Lakes region. Given that the price for iron ore is essentially a global price, domestic¶ producers of iron ore pellets are benefitting from higher margins due to lower electricity and natural gas prices. With these incrementally higher margins, domestic iron ore pellet production is likely¶ higher than it would otherwise be.¶ The steel industry is expected to be reactivated with the improvement of auto manufacturing and an increase¶ in construction activity. Moreover, the development of shale gas has given a considerable boost¶ to the steel industry by increasing the demand for steel pipes. Used for drilling, production, transportation,¶ and distribution, steel pipes are essential to the natural gas industry, and the large infrastructure¶ investments already announced could have quite a significant impact on the steel industry.

#### Steel industry key to the navy

Gibson 11 – Thomas J. Gibson received his law degree from Georgetown University where he graduated magna cum laude. He holds a Master of Marine Affairs degree from the University of Rhode Island and a B.S. in Naval Architecture from the United States Naval Academy. Gibson served as Senior Vice President of Advocacy for the American Chemistry Council. Previously, Gibson served as the Senior Vice President, Government Affairs for the Portland Cement Association. Prior to joining PCA in 2004, Gibson served as Chief of Staff for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2011, "Profile of the American Iron and Steel Institute 2010-2011"www.steel.org/~/media/Files/AISI/About AISI/Profile Brochure F-singles\_CX.pdf

Military uses for steel are extensive. Thousands of skilled men and women of the American steel industry work to produce high-quality, cost-competitive products that are used by the military in various applications ranging from aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines to Patriot and Stinger missiles, armor plate for tanks and field artillery pieces, as well as every major military aircraft in production today. Some examples of steel use in defense applications are: 􀀩 The USS New York was built with 24 tons of scrap steel reclaimed and recycled from the World Trade Center. 􀀩 The USS George H.W. Bush, an aircraft carrier named after the 41st President, contains 47,000 tons of structural steel and serves as home to 6,000 Navy personnel. 􀀩 Steel is a strategic material needed to strengthen existing U.S. infrastructure and installations. All segments of the domestic steel industry contribute directly or indirectly to the defense industrial base. Whether it is missiles, jet aircraft, submarines, helicopters, Humvees® or munitions, American-made steels and specialty metals are crucial components of U.S. military strength. **Steel plate is used in the bodies and propulsion systems of the naval fleet**. The control cables on virtually all military aircraft, including fighter jets and military transport planes, are produced from steel wire rope. In addition, land-based vehicles such as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Abrams Tank and mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles use significant amounts of steel.

#### Collapse of the navy causes great power wars

Conway et al. 7 [James T., General, U.S. Marine Corps, Gary Roughead, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” October, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf]

No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s wars. In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.

## Case

### Prolif

#### PROLIF SOLVES INEVITABLE MISCALCULATIONS AND ESCALATION AND NEW NUCLEAR STATES WILL FIT INTO A DETERRENCE WORLD ORDER AND PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF MAJOR WARS

Waltz in ‘3

[Kenneth N., Genius & Adjunct Professor, Columbia University, Professor Emeritus, UC-Berkeley, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, with Scott D. Sagan, p.43-45.

What will a world populated by a few more nuclear states look like? I have drawn a picture of such a world that accords with experience throughout the nuclear age. Those who dread a world with more nuclear states do little more than assert that more is worse and claim without substantiation that new nuclear states will be less responsible and less capable of self control than the old ones have been. They feel fears that many felt when they imagined how a nuclear China would behave. Such fears have proved unfounded as nuclear weapons have slowly spread. I have found many reasons for believing that with more nuclear states the world will have a promising future. I have reached this unusual conclusion for three main reasons. First, international politics is a self-help system, and in such systems the principal parties determine their own fate, the fate of other parties, and the fate of the system. This will continue to be so. Second, nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can do. Early in this century Norman Angell argued that war would not occur because it could not pay. But conventional wars have brought political gains to some countries at the expense of others. Among nuclear countries, possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains. In the nuclear age Angell's dictum becomes persuasive. When the active use of force threatens to bring great losses, war becomes less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear weapons reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China. One must expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them? Third, new nuclear states will feel the constraints that present nuclear states have experienced. New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of dangers than some of the old ones have been. Until recently, only the great and some of the major powers have had nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons have spread slowly, con- [\*45//wyo-tjc] ventional weapons have proliferated. Under these circumstances, wars have been fought not at the center but at the periphery of international politics. The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons make wars hard to start. These statements hold for small as for big nuclear powers. Because they do, the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.

#### THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SLOWS THE PACE OF RAPID BALANCE SHIFTS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL. THIS SOLVES THE OUTBREAK AND ESCALATION OF CATASTROPHIC WAR\*\*

Alagappa in ‘8

[Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow at East-West Center, “Nuclear Weapons and National Security”, in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. M. Alagappa, 479-480//wyo-tjc]

Nuclear weapons cast a long shadow that informs in fundamental ways the strategic policies and behavior of major powers (all but one of which possess nuclear weapons), their allies, and those states facing existential threats. They induce caution and set boundaries to the strategic interaction of nuclear weapon states and condition the role and use of force in their interactions. The danger of escalation limits military options in a crisis between nuclear weapon states and shapes the purpose and manner in which military force is used. Although relevant only in a small number of situations, these include the most serious regional conflicts that could escalate to large—scale war. Nuclear weapons help prevent the outbreak of hostilities, keep hostilities limited when they do break out, and prevent their escalation to major wars. Nuclear weapons enable weaker powers to deter stronger adversaries and help ameliorate the effects of imbalance in conventional military capability. By providing insurance to cope with unanticipated contingencies, they reduce immediate anxieties over military imbalances and vulnerabilities. Nuclear weapons enable major powers to take a long view of the strategic environment, set a moderate pace for their force development, and focus on other national priorities, including mutually beneficial interaction with other nuclear weapon states. Although nuclear weapons by themselves do not confer major power status, they are an important ingredient of power for countries that conduct themselves in a responsible manner and are experiencing rapid growth in other dimensions of power.

#### NUCLEAR WEAPONS FORCE CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO THE DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REALMS BY MAKING WAR TOO COSTLY, SOLVING THE OUTBREAK OF MAJOR HEGEMONIC WARS AS BALANCES SHIFT

Alagappa in ‘8

[Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow at East-West Center, “Nuclear Weapons and National Security”, in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. M. Alagappa, P. 484//wyo-tjc]

The fear of escalation to nuclear war conditions the role of force in major power relations and circumscribes strategic interaction among them. By restraining measures and actions that could lead to conflict escalation, nuclear weapons limit the competitive strategic interaction of major powers to internal and external balancing for deterrence purposes; constrain their resort to coercive diplomacy and compellence; and shift the burden of international competition and adjustment in status and influence to the economic, political, and diplomatic arenas. They also render remote the possibility of a hegemonic war should a power transition occur in the region. More immediately, nuclear weapons enable Russia and China to deter the much stronger United States and mitigate the negative consequences of the imbalance in conventional military capability. Nuclear weapons reinforce India’s confidence in dealing with China. By reducing military vulnerabilities and providing insurance against unexpected contingencies, nuclear weapons enable major powers to take a long view and engage in competition as well as cooperation with potential adversaries. Differences and disputes among them are frozen or settled through negotiations. Though they are not the only or even primary factor driving strategic visions and policies, nuclear weapons are an important consideration, especially in the role of force in major power strategic interaction. They prevent the outbreak of large—scale war. Military clashes when they occur tend to be limited.

### Natural Gas

#### 1st, no warming scenario:

#### Warming not real/anthropogenic- IPCC predictions fail and rely on faulty computer models – even if they win that the earth is warming, the rate is too slow to trigger their impacts

Bast & Taylor ‘11

[Joseph and James, CEO of the Heartland Institute, author of Rebuilding America’s Schools, Why We Spend Too Much on Health Care, Eco-Sanity: A Common-Sense Guide to Environmentalism, Education & Capitalism, Climate Change Reconsidered, and The Patriot’s Toolbox, and managing editor of Environment & Climate News, Senior Fellow for The Heartland Institute, bachelor degree from Dartmouth College and law degree from the Syracuse University College of Law, “Global Warming: Not a Crisis,” The Heartland Institute, 8.2.11., http://heartland.org/ideas/global-warming-not-crisis) //wyo-hdm]

How Much Warming? NASA satellite data recorded since 1979 allow us to check the accuracy of claims that the past three decades have been warming at an alarming rate. The data show a warming rate of 0.123 degrees C per decade. This is considerably less than what land-based temperature stations report during the same time period, and which are relied on by the IPCC (Christy, 2009). If the Earth’s temperature continues to rise at the rate of the past three decades, the planet would see only 1.23 degrees C warming over the course of an entire century. Most climate scientists, even “skeptics,” acknowledge that rising CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere would, all other things held constant, cause some small amount of warming. Alarmists claim that small amount will trigger increases in the amount of moisture in the atmosphere, which in turn will cause further warming. But other scientists have found no evidence of rising levels of moisture in those areas of the atmosphere where the models claim it should be found. Without this “amplification,” there is no global warming crisis (Singer, 2011). While the global climate warmed slightly during the 1980s and 1990s, it has not warmed at all since 2000, and there is some evidence that a cooling trend has begun (Taylor, 2007). This contradicts the predictions of the IPCC and poses a challenge to the theory that CO2 concentrations play a major role in global temperature trends. It confirms the views of many less-politicized climate scientists who acknowledge that the global climate is always warming or cooling (Michaels, 2005; Christy, 2006). The scientific community’s lack of certainty about future climate trends is rooted in the shortcomings of computer models. These models are the centerpiece of the IPCC’‘s reports, yet it is widely recognized that they fail to account for changes in precipitation, water vapor, and clouds that are likely to occur in a warmer world. It is a case of “garbage in, garbage out.” If we cannot predict how much warming will occur, how can we claim that continued human emissions of greenhouse gases is harmful?

#### 2nd, Natural gas doesn’t cause warming-

#### No impact to short term warming from natural gas, low risk leakage would be substantial enough to cause higher warming and it’s better in the long run

Chameides, ‘12

(Bill, Dean of Duke University’s Nicholas School of the Environment, “Natural Gas: A Bridge to a Low-Carbon Future or Not?,” 7-20-12, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-chameides/-natural-gas-a-bridge-to\_b\_1690857.html, accessed 9-20-12) PM

Cathles's point about the transient effects of methane fugitive emissions is well taken. But there is a potential catch and it relates to short-term climate effects. During the transition period, when fugitive methane from using natural gas would build up in the atmosphere, there is a possibility, depending upon the magnitude of the methane emissions, that we would experience more short-term warming than if we were to have stuck with coal and oil. We might think of this as the transient version of the Howarth argument. Now, as long as the fugitive emissions are small or the Earth system is "reversible," the transient Howarth scenario does not seem all that worrisome. But what if the emissions are large? And what if the disturbances from global warming are not reversible? Then we would have a problem. The transition to natural gas would lead to more warming for a period of time until natural gas is phased out and the excess methane is removed from the atmosphere. With the exit of the excess methane, the extra warming would also go away. Cathles seems to argue that all would be well: "Even when methane leakage is so large (L = 10% of consumption) that substituting gas for coal and oil increases global warming in the short term, the benefit of gas substitution returns in the long term."

#### 3rd, Nuke power causes warming-

#### 1. Radiative Heat From Nuclear waste causes warming

Beyeneb et. al 11

[R. Zevenhovena, Department of Chemical Engineering, Thermal and Flow Engineering Laboratory, Åbo Akademi University, A. Beyeneb, Department of Mechanical Engineering, San Diego State University, “The relative contribution of waste heat from power plants to global warming”, Energy

Volume 36, Issue 6, June 2011, Pages 3754–3762, Accessed via Science direct [\\wyo-bb](file:///%5C%5Cwyo-bb)]

A comparison was made of the heating effects as a result of globalwarming, i.e. radiative forcing due to emissions of the greenhouse CO2, from powerplant and as a result of the waste heat releases from the same units. The arguments developed and the results produced will put more emphasis on energy efficiency not as a merely economic value but also for climate mitigation, showing also that replacing fossil fuel-derived power production by (for example) nuclear fission will not eliminate the enhanced greenhouse gas effect. An immediate radiative forcing effect for a 1000 MWe fossil fuel-fired powerplant occurs within the range half-sphere (dome) with a radius of around 10 km, outside which the CO2 emissions have been diluted to less than 0.1 ppm-vol above the background level (assuming a typical wind speed of 10 m/s). Nonetheless this background level increases with ∼2 ppm-vol/year at the moment, which gives a global heat-up effect of 0.0028 °C annually. For electricity production in year 2005 the estimated total waste heat release from electricity production resulted in a global heat-up effect of 0.0021 °C for that year, i.e., an almost equally strong warming effect.

#### 2. Nuclear power production speeds up warming- construction

Caldicott 6 (Helen, “Nuclear power is not the answer to global warming or anything else”, p.4)

What exactly is nuclear power? It is a very expensive, sophisticated, and dangerous way to boil water. Uranium fuel rods are placed in water in a reactor core, they reach critical mass, and they produce vast quantities of heat, which boils the water. Steam is directed through pipes to turn a turbine, which generates electricity. The scientists who were involved in the Manhattan Project creating nuclear weapons developed a way to harness nuclear energy to generate electricity. Because their guilt was so great, they were determined to use their ghastly new invention to help the human race. Nuclear fission harnessed “atoms for peace,” and the nuclear PR industry proclaimed that nuclear power would provide an endless supply of electcitiy – referred to as “sunshine units” – that would be good for the environment and “too cheap to meter.” They were wrong. Although a nuclear power plant itself releases no carbon dioxide, the production of nuclear electricity depends upon a vast, complex, and hidden industrial infrastructure that is never featured by the nuclear industry in its propaganda, but that actually releases a large amount of carbon dioxide as well as other global warming gases. One is led to believe that the nuclear reactor stands alone, an autonomous creator of energy. In fact, the vast infrastrcutre necessary to create nuclear energy, called the nuclear fuel cycle, is a prodigious user of fossil fuel and coal. The production of carbon dioxide (CO2) is one measurement that indicates the amount of energy used in the production of the nuclear fuel cycle. Most of the energy used to create nuclear energy – to mine uranium ore for fuel, to crush and mill the ore, to enrich the uranium, to create the concrete and steel for the reacotr, and to store the thermally and radioactively hot nuclear waste – comes from the consumption of fossil fuels, that is coal or oil. When these materials are burned to produce energy, they form CO2 (reflecting coal and oil’s origins in ancient trees and other organic carboniferous material laid down under the earth’s crust millions of years ago). For each ton of carbon burned, 3.7 tons of CO2 gas added to the atmosphere, and thisis the source of today’s global warming.

#### Prices Scenario:

#### 1st, squo solves prices: Exports are starting now

Bass, Navigant Energy director, ‘12
(Richard, Gordon Pickring, “The U.S. Has A Natural Gas Glut; Why Exporting It As LNG Is A Good Idea,” 6-13-12,<http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2012/06/13/the-u-s-has-a-natural-gas-glut-why-exporting-it-as-lng-is-a-good-idea/>, accessed 9-21-12) PM

The emergence of shale gas has caused natural gas prices in North America to drop to the lowest levels seen in decades. Shale gas resources elsewhere in the world, however, have not yet been developed to the same extent—creating a sustainable arbitrage opportunity. Given the potential profitability of liquefying surplus North American gas production and exporting it as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), a number of companies are now willing to develop capital-intensive natural gas export projects. LNG exports will help to provide better balance between supply and demand in the market, dampening price volatility in North America, and providing circumstances in which industrial gas investments and feedstock natural gas purchases can be made with greater confidence in long-term natural gas pricing.

# 2NC

#### U.S. nuclear energy industry declining

Banks 2/9

[Dave, policy advisor to Heartland and the Director of D.C. Operations for the Alliance of Wise Energy Decisions (AWED), an informal coalition of Tea Party activists focused on energy and environment policy, “The Decline of America’s Civil Nuclear Industry and its Impact on Our National Security” <http://blog.heartland.org/2013/02/the-decline-of-americas-civil-nuclear-industry-and-its-impact-on-our-national-security/>//wyo-hdm]

In reality, America’s [nuclear energy](http://policybot.enginez.com/results.engz?sort=publication_date+desc&uq=nuclear+energy) industry is in rapid decline relative to its foreign competitors. With the aging of our civil nuclear fleet and the lack of new builds, America’s nuclear program has sharply contracted over the last few decades. In the 1980s, for example, 100 percent of equipment for U.S. nuclear plants was manufactured in America, compared to less than 25 percent today. Moreover, the U.S. share of global nuclear exports decreased significantly between 1994 and 2008, according to a U.S. government report. Specifically, the U.S. share of sensitive nuclear material exports declined from roughly 30 to 10 percent, and the country’s share of exports of nuclear reactors, major components, and equipment dropped from 11 to 7 percent. There are a number of reasons for the demise of the sector, but chief among them are [financing](http://blog.heartland.org/2013/02/the-decline-of-americas-civil-nuclear-industry-and-its-impact-on-our-national-security/) hurdles and cheaper forms of electricity generation, as well as the failure to find a permanent repository for high-level nuclear waste. More recently, cheap shale gas has become a threat to the continued operation of existing reactors – not just a deterrent to new construction. Duke Energy’s recent decision to shut down its nuclear plant in Florida, instead of repairing it was largely due to the economic benefits of fuel switching to natural gas. And late last year, Dominion announced its intention to shut down its nuclear plant in Wisconsin – a move that was also blamed on the abundance of shale gas.

**A) WITHDRAWAL TO OFFSHORE BALANCING RISKS INSTABILITY THAT DESTROYS THE ECONOMY**

**THAYER** (Professor of Strategic Studies at Missouri State) **2006**

[Bradley, “In Defense of Primacy”, National Interest, Dec, p. asp //wyo-tjc]

**A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point** the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include **ensuring that critical resources like oil flow** around the world, **that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish** and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, **a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives** of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted**. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home"**, thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, **does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression**. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.

#### The navy solves piracy

Hilley 8 – Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class (Monique, “Coalition Forces Work To Deter Piracy In Gulf Of Aden”, The United States Department of the Navy, 1/17/09, Story Number: NNS090117-01, Online @ http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story\_id=41897)

USS SAN ANTONIO, At sea (NNS) -- Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 is working closely with international navies in the Gulf of Aden to conduct counterpiracy operations and ensure a lawful maritime order in the region. "We're out here as a force, with the coalition nations, to ensure commerce flows freely throughout the world," explained Rear Adm. Terry McKnight, commander, CTF 151. "We are working to achieve an objective of preventing piracy at sea. Over the past few years, we've learned from many combined operations that working with the coalition is key to our success throughout the world." The mission of CTF 151 is to prevent and deter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. The task force, which has assembled on board the amphibious transport dock ship USS San Antonio (LPD 17), has many capabilities which are enhanced by the ship's crew. The personnel currently embarked aboard San Antonio in support of CTF 151 counterpiracy operations include a helicopter squadron, fleet surgical team, boarding teams and several elements from the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard. "This mission is very important for the maritime strategy of our nation and also to work with our coalition nations," said McKnight. "We are out here to demonstrate that the United States Navy will not allow criminal acts on the high seas and that we want, as best we can, to improve the open trade agreements throughout the world." Piracy acts spiked in the region in mid-August due to a very aggressive increase in activity by a clan on the north coast of Somalia. In response to the activity, Vice Adm. William Gortney, commander, Combined Maritime Forces, directed the establishment of the maritime security patrol area (MSPA), an area coalition ships and aircraft patrol to prevent destabilizing activity. "Because of the complexity of the operations, I determined it was necessary to establish CTF 151 to create a task force with a mission and a mandate from the United Nations to conduct counterpiracy operations throughout the area of responsibility," said Gortney during a press briefing at the Pentagon Jan. 15. Although the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) do not have a mandate to conduct counterpiracy operations, combined task forces each have a particular mandate under which they operate. Any nation that does not yet have the authority to conduct counterpiracy operations will continue to work in Combined Task Force 150, while those that seek the authority to operate with CTF 151 will bring their collective capabilities together to deter, disrupt and eventually bring to justice the maritime criminals involved in the piracy events. "It's really a fascinating story to watch unfold as, at this point, 14 nations have sent their navies to work against the destabilizing activity," added Gortney. CTF 151, with the International Maritime Organization, created the maritime security patrol area as a place to channel the shipping so that they could concentrate naval activity. The task force includes three phases, which outline critical mission goals. The first phase is focused on bringing more international navies into the efforts to help solve this international problem. The second phase involves working with the shipping industry to develop and share practices that prevent pirates from successfully boarding their vessels. The third phase, once authorized, will allow the task force to deliver suspected pirates to court, where they will be held accountable for their actions. "We've had great effects on the first two," explained Gortney. "Fourteen nations are down there. The shipping industry is having the greatest impact. They're doing a terrific job of sharing best practices, speed, maneuver and non-kinetic defensive measures that will prevent pirates from getting aboard the vessel. We have had a great effect on that. In the last six weeks, there have only been four successful piracy attacks." CTF 151 is working very closely with the U.S. State Department to finalize an agreement with one of the nations in the area that will allow CTF 151 and coalition forces to disrupt, deter, capture and hold suspected pirates accountable for their actions. The task force expects that authority to be granted within the next week. "We are going to aggressively go after the pirates that are conducting pirate activity," said Gortney. "We have to make it unpleasant to be a pirate." CTF 151 is a multinational task force conducting counterpiracy operations to detect and deter piracy in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and Red Sea. It was established to create a lawful maritime order and develop security in the maritime environment.

#### Piracy causes oil spills---devastates marine life for decades

Middleton 8—Roger, consultant reseacher in the Africa Programme at the Chatham House, the Royal Institute of Economic Affairs, "Piracy in Somalia", October, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/1008piracysomalia.pdf>

Large oil tankers pass through the Gulf of Aden and the danger exists that a pirate attack could cause a major oil spill in what is a very sensitive and important ecosystem. During the attack on the Takayama the ship’s fuel tanks were penetrated and oil spilled into the sea. The consequences of a more sustained attack could be much worse. As pirates become bolder and use ever more powerful weaponry a tanker could be set on fire, sunk or forced ashore, any of which could result in an environmental catastrophe that would devastate marine and bird life for years to come. The pirates’ aim is to extort ransom payments and to date that has been their main focus; however, the possibility that they could destroy shipping is very real.

#### Ocean destruction causes extinction

Craig 3 (Robin, Professor of Law at Indiana, “Taking Steps,” 34 McGeorge Law Review. 155, Lexis)

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique. The Black Sea is a microcosm of what is happening to the ocean systems at large. The stresses piled up: overfishing, oil spills, industrial discharges, nutrient pollution, wetlands destruction, the introduction of an alien species. The sea weakened, slowly at first, then collapsed with shocking suddenness. The lessons of this tragedy should not be lost to the rest of us, because much of what happened here is being repeated all over the world. The ecological stresses imposed on the Black Sea were not unique to communism. Nor, sadly, was the failure of governments to respond to the emerging crisis. Oxygen-starved "dead zones" appear with increasing frequency off the coasts of major cities and major rivers, forcing marine animals to flee and killing all that cannot. Ethics as well as enlightened self-interest thus suggest that the United States should protect fully-functioning marine ecosystems wherever possible - even if a few fishers go out of business as a result.

#### 3. Natural gas prices make nuclear economically unviable – licenses are inadequate to avoid decommissioning

Scott DiSavino, “Dominon closing nuclear plant due to low natgas prices”, Reuterss, 10/22/2012

For Virginia-based Dominion, the decision to decommission the plant, in the second quarter of next year, was "based purely on economics," according to Thomas Farrell, Dominion chairman, president and chief executive.¶ Attempts to find a buyer failed, even though the plant had a renewed license that did not expire until 2033. With natural gas prices expected to remain under pressure from rising shale output, the company decided to take a third-quarter after-tax charge of $281 million to decommission Kewaunee.

#### 4. Link outweighs the link turn – even failed projects jack up the price

Madsen et al 9 (Travis, Analyst @ Frontier Group and Maryland PIRG Foundation, Johanna Neumann @ Maryland PIRG Foundation, and Emily Rusch @ CalPIRG Education Fund, "The High Cost of Nuclear Power," http://www.nirs.org/nukerelapse/calvert/highcostnpower\_mdpirg.pdf)

N o power company has successfully ¶ ordered a nuclear reactor in the ¶ United States since 1973. Despite¶ promises of power that would be “too ¶ cheap to meter,” the last generation of ¶ nuclear reactors ran aground on skyrocketing construction costs. Of 75 nuclear¶ reactors completed between 1966 and¶ 1986, the average reactor cost more than¶ triple its original construction budget.¶ 1¶ Later-built reactors came in as much ¶ as 1,200 percent over-budget.¶ 2¶ In 1985,¶ Forbes magazine wrote that “the failure ¶ of the U.S. nuclear power program ranks ¶ as the largest managerial disaster in business history, a disaster on a monumental ¶ scale.”¶ 3¶ Electricity customers ended up paying¶ the price. Only one-half of the reactors¶ proposed were ever built, and ratepayers ¶ often had to bear the costs of abandoned ¶ projects. Where reactor projects were¶ completed, rates often increased. Finally,¶ during the restructuring of the electricity ¶ industry in the 1990s, ratepayers were¶ saddled with billions in “stranded costs” ¶ from failed investments in nuclear power, ¶ saving nuclear power plant owners (and¶ their shareholders) from huge losses.

## Natural Gas

#### Add on-

#### 1st, methane usage insufficient- states solve emissions

Loris 2/11

[Nicolas, an economist, focuses on energy, environmental and regulatory issues as the Herbert and Joyce Morgan fellow at The Heritage Foundation, “U.S. Natural Gas Exports: Lift Restrictions and Empower the States” 2.11.2013. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/us-natural-gas-exports-lift-restrictions-and-empower-the-states>//wyo-hdm]

In November 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Lisa Jackson acknowledged the states' role: "States are stepping up and doing a good job. It doesn't have to be EPA that regulates the 10,000 wells that might go in."[[11]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/us-natural-gas-exports-lift-restrictions-and-empower-the-states%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn11) But states are not just now stepping up-states have effectively regulated oil and gas production and hydraulic fracturing for decades. In Pennsylvania, fracking has been taking place since the 1960s, with nearly 100,000 oil and gas wells fracked and no instances of contamination of groundwater. The same clean record is true for Ohio, where over 70,000 oil and gas wells have been fracked since the 1960s. The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission has compiled statistics for all 50 states, each of which has a flawless record when it comes to fracking and groundwater protection.[[12]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/us-natural-gas-exports-lift-restrictions-and-empower-the-states%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn12) Despite the states' regulatory effectiveness, the federal government is pursuing costly and duplicative regulations. In April 2012, the EPA announced its first air-emission rules for hydraulic fracturing. The EPA contends that the regulations are necessary to reduce emissions of volatile organic compounds and hazardous air pollutants. However, the EPA quantifies only environmental benefits from regulating methane, clearly indicating this rule was more about regulating a greenhouse gas. The EPA's rule miserably fails the cost-benefit test-the agency's own analysis projects $745 million in annual costs and just $11 million to $19 million in environmental benefits. Moreover, the EPA has grossly overestimated methane emissions from the wells.[[13]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/us-natural-gas-exports-lift-restrictions-and-empower-the-states%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn13) Further, the Department of the Interior released a draft rule on public disclosure of chemicals on federal lands despite the fact that states have successfully managed chemical disclosure.[[14]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/us-natural-gas-exports-lift-restrictions-and-empower-the-states%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn14) Congress has also introduced legislation that would regulate fracking fluids under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) despite the fact that the 2005 Energy Policy Act codified that Congress never intended to regulate fracking (except when using diesel oil in the fracking process under SDWA).[[15]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/us-natural-gas-exports-lift-restrictions-and-empower-the-states%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn15) Hydraulic fracturing had been safely regulated for a quarter century before Congress enacted SDWA in 1974.

#### 2nd, alternative causes to methane use

Bullis ‘12

[Kevin, MIT Technology Review’s senior editor for energy has taken me, among other places, to the oil-rich deserts of the Middle East and to China, where mountains are being carved away to build the looming cities, “Measuring the Climate Impact of Natural Gas” 12.14.2012. <http://www.technologyreview.com/news/508536/measuring-the-climate-impact-of-natural-gas/>//wyo-hdm]

 It’s relatively easy to measure the amount of methane in the air, but it’s difficult to know exactly where it came from. That’s necessary to determine which gas drilling company, for example, might have a particularly leaky system. It’s also important because there are many sources of methane other than the natural gas distribution system, including natural methane leaks and methane produced by livestock and in landfills. “It is complicated to attribute accurately fugitive emissions to one particular source using [conventional] air-sampling tools,” says Francis O’Sullivan, a researcher at MIT who studies methane emissions. Picarro says its new technology makes pinpointing the source far easier. Its mobile measurement system is mounted on a [car](http://www.technologyreview.com/news/508536/measuring-the-climate-impact-of-natural-gas/), allowing technicians to drive through an area to quickly pinpoint the source of leaks in real time. It combines an advanced methane detector—based on technology from Stanford University that it brought to market in 2005—with wind-direction sensors, isotope detectors, and proprietary algorithms. The isotope measurements can determine whether the gas comes from a biological source like a landfill or from fossil fuel. Methane measurements, integrated with wind data and information about the precise location and the speed of the car, is used to plot the source of the leak on Google Maps. In one test, the system detected a leak as technicians drove past a petrochemical plant, which would probably have been assumed to be the source of the methane, says Eric Crosson, Picarro’s chief technology officer. But the isotope measurements identified the source of the leak as biological, and the wind measurements indicated that it was coming from an empty field, which turned out to be a leaking landfill. He says determining this sort of thing could have taken days or weeks with previous technology. The technology was recently used to [survey](http://www.technologyreview.com/news/508536/measuring-the-climate-impact-of-natural-gas/) all 785 miles of roads in Boston over the course of six weeks. It identified 3,356 spots where methane levels were more than 15 times higher than normal. This level of analysis goes well beyond what natural gas companies normally do to detect leaks, in part because they’re mostly concerned with larger leaks. In Boston, only six of the leaks were considered large enough for the local utility to do anything about them. PG&E in California, under pressure to improve its practices after a large natural gas explosion in 2010, has also adopted the Picarro technology. PG&E says the technology is a thousand times more sensitive than conventional methods, and lets the company find and fix leaks far more quickly. Whether Picarro’s technology, and other technology for studying methane leaks, is deployed widely could depend on regulation. “Absolutely there is a need for better measurements,” says O’Sullivan. “The question remains, who will pay for it?”

#### 3rd, CO2 real risk

Colose ‘08

[Chris, Atmospheric & Oceanic Sciences studies at UW-Madison, “Is methane a ‘better’ greenhouse gas than CO2?” 11.10.2008. <http://chriscolose.wordpress.com/2008/11/10/methane-and-co2/>//wyo-hdm]

The idea that methane is a more ‘potent’ greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide is a popular notion. There’s an interesting discussion going on in [Bad Astronomy](http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/badastronomy/2008/11/06/greenhouse-hot-air/) by Phil Plait. Plait says, Methane is in fact a more efficient greenhouse gas than CO2, but there’s so much less of it that the overall effect is much lower. Methane’s contribution to the greenhouse effect is only about half or less that of carbon dioxide. Another issue is residence time. Carbon Dioxide has a lifetime in the atmosphere of roughly a century, with at least a quarter of the extra input sticking around for much longer. In a well-oxygenated atmosphere, methane oxidizes into CO2 quickly so it’s hard to build up very high concentrations and the “extra pulse” of methane lasts around a decade. If the concentrations were reversed, and CH4 was at 385 ppmv, and CO2 was at less than 2 ppmv, then the popular idea would be that CO2 is a much more potent greenhouse gas. There is nothing “special” about methane that makes it much powerful than CO2, this has more to do with the abundance of each gas in the present atmosphere. Methane is important though, and should be in the near future when it comes to global warming. It is currently is the second most important single forcing agent next to carbon dioxide for the 20th century warming. The other issue often associated with methane is catastrophic release from hydrates in the deep ocean. This would indeed cause an extremely large warming effect (Archer 2007 says 10% of that methane being released would cause an impact equivalent to 10x CO2). The residence time of methane also becomes longer at such higher concentrations. Though this is a problem that would take place on scales of millennia, and shouldn’t be an issue this century.

#### 4th, nuclear power emits CO2

Caldicott 6 (Helen, “Nuclear power is not the answer to global warming or anything else”, p.4)

What exactly is nuclear power? It is a very expensive, sophisticated, and dangerous way to boil water. Uranium fuel rods are placed in water in a reactor core, they reach critical mass, and they produce vast quantities of heat, which boils the water. Steam is directed through pipes to turn a turbine, which generates electricity. The scientists who were involved in the Manhattan Project creating nuclear weapons developed a way to harness nuclear energy to generate electricity. Because their guilt was so great, they were determined to use their ghastly new invention to help the human race. Nuclear fission harnessed “atoms for peace,” and the nuclear PR industry proclaimed that nuclear power would provide an endless supply of electcitiy – referred to as “sunshine units” – that would be good for the environment and “too cheap to meter.” They were wrong. Although a nuclear power plant itself releases no carbon dioxide, the production of nuclear electricity depends upon a vast, complex, and hidden industrial infrastructure that is never featured by the nuclear industry in its propaganda, but that actually releases a large amount of carbon dioxide as well as other global warming gases. One is led to believe that the nuclear reactor stands alone, an autonomous creator of energy. In fact, the vast infrastrcutre necessary to create nuclear energy, called the nuclear fuel cycle, is a prodigious user of fossil fuel and coal. The production of carbon dioxide (CO2) is one measurement that indicates the amount of energy used in the production of the nuclear fuel cycle. Most of the energy used to create nuclear energy – to mine uranium ore for fuel, to crush and mill the ore, to enrich the uranium, to create the concrete and steel for the reacotr, and to store the thermally and radioactively hot nuclear waste – comes from the consumption of fossil fuels, that is coal or oil. When these materials are burned to produce energy, they form CO2 (reflecting coal and oil’s origins in ancient trees and other organic carboniferous material laid down under the earth’s crust millions of years ago). For each ton of carbon burned, 3.7 tons of CO2 gas added to the atmosphere, and thisis the source of today’s global warming.

#### 5th, no impact to ozone

#### A. Ozone depletion has tiny impact on humans – Only 350 in the U.S.

Bjorn Lomborg 01, Associate Professor Political Science, University of Aarhus, 2001, The Skeptical Environmentalist, p. 275

About 95 percent of skin cancers today consist of the highly curable basal and squamous cell cancers, whereas the last 5 percent consist of the much more lethal melanoma skin cancer. In total, the US experiences about 50,000 new melanoma cases each year and about a million new basal and squamous cell cancers, with almost all mortality stemming from the melanomas. Assuming no change in behavior (sun exposure, etc.) and full compliance with the CFC protocols, it is estimated that the current ozone minimum will lead to more cancers in the future, reaching a maximum in 2060 of 27,000 extra annual skin cancers in the US, or an increase in total skin cancer of about 3 percent. Since the vast majority of extra cancers will be the almost entirely curable skin cancers, the maximum extra deaths in 2060 in the US are estimated at about 350 or about 5 percent of all skin cancer deaths. Thus, even at ozone depletion’s greatest impact, it will cause a relatively slight increase in the cancer incidence and death rate.

#### B. Status quo international agreements will solve.

European Commission 3/29/2004, Briefing, http://www.hri.org/news/europe/midex/2004/04-03-30.midex.html

The European Commission welcomes the outcome of an extraordinary meeting of the Parties to the 1987 Montreal Protocol, on 24-26 March in Montreal, the Protocol's birthplace. The 183 Parties agreed how to respect a scheduled ban on the production and consumption of methyl bromide, a highly ozone damaging pesticide still in use in some countries. Under the Montreal Protocol, the ban is to come into effect in industrialised countries on 1 January 2005. Demands for far-reaching exemptions put forward by the US and a number of other countries, including some EU Member States, had jeopardised the phase-out timetable and were the main reason that a previous conference of the Parties in Nairobi last November collapsed. "This is the best piece of news I received last weekend," said Margot Wallstrom, Commissioner for the Environment. "The Montreal Protocol is the most successful environmental treaty to date. I am relieved and glad that the disagreement over methyl bromide has been resolved, thanks to flexibility and commitment by all Parties. This will allow us to continue the Protocol's implementation as previously agreed. We simply have to stick to the timetable to phase out all ozone-damaging substances as agreed. Only this will allow the ozone layer to regain its full protective power and save current and future generations from the sun's dangerous ultraviolet radiation." Ban on methyl bromide production and import Methyl bromide is a pesticide that is still used by some strawberry and tomato growers and mill owners to kill pests in soils and food processing facilities. Its damaging effect on the Earth's protective ozone layer became known in the early 1990s, prompting the Parties to the Montreal Protocol to agree on a phase-out schedule and a production and import ban to come into effect in industrialised countries in 2005. Critical use exemptions to the ban are to be granted by the 183 Parties themselves, acting in agreement, in a very limited number of cases where there are no technically and economically feasible alternatives. For the vast majority of uses, there are alternatives that are now in use in many countries around the world. The sticking point among the 183 Parties were the critical use exemptions that the US and 16 other industrialised countries requested to the 2005 ban on production and import of methyl bromide in industrialised countries. In total, they had asked to produce or import 14,000 tonnes of methyl bromide under the ban, with the US alone requesting 9,500 tonnes and EU member states demanding 4,000 tonnes. The US request exceeded current levels of methyl bromide production and import in the US (7,500 tonnes) and asked for more methyl bromide than 126 developing countries at present use in total. Some other 80 countries have already familiarised their farmers and mill owners with alternatives so that methyl bromide is hardly used in these countries any longer, if at all. They include the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and Japan, but also developing countries such as Brazil, Costa Rica and Argentina. A regular conference of the Parties last November in Nairobi collapsed as the Parties could not resolve the exemption issue. Last week's extraordinary meeting in Montreal was specifically scheduled to find a solution to the issue. Outcome of the Montreal meeting In Montreal, the Parties agreed on the following: Critical-use exemptions and permitted levels of production and consumption for methyl bromide are granted for the year 2005 on the basis of the scientific and technical recommendations of two expert panels set up under the Montreal Protocol: the Technical and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP) and the Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee (MBTOC). The assessment methodology of the MBTOC for critical use exemptions will be reviewed over the coming months in order to strengthen it. This will ensure that exemptions are only granted in cases where there are no technically and economically feasible alternatives. This also provides end users of methyl bromide with certainty with regard to the 2005 season and will allow the start of the licensing process in the EU and elsewhere. Nonetheless, in each country permitted consumption and production levels in 2005 must not exceed current levels, which are at 30% of the 1991 base year level. Only the US is at this level with other countries well below.

#### C. Ozone is rapidly recovering

EDIE News, August 8, 2003, “Ozone layer benefits from CFC ban,” http://www.edie.net/news/news\_story.asp?id=7352&channel=0

A team of researchers from the University of Alabama in Huntsville, has found that not only is the ozone depletion rate in the upper stratosphere slowing, but the rate of production for ozone-destroying chlorine is also dropping. The scientists believe that this is due to the success of the Montreal Protocol - an international ban on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), chemicals used in refrigerants and aerosol propellants, which came into force in 1989. Professor Michael Newchurch, who led the research, said: “This is the beginning of a recovery of the ozone layer. We had a monumental problem of global scale that we have started to solve. Now we can say that what we are doing is working and we should continue the ban.” CFC molecules take several years to percolate into the stratosphere where they are broken up by ultra-violet light, releasing chlorine. This free chlorine reacts with ozone and converts it into three oxygen molecules, before bonding with hydrogen to form hydrogen chloride. Eventually it drifts back down into the lower atmosphere, dissolves into water vapour and gets rained back down to earth. The whole process can take decades. Using data from three NASA satellites and three international ground stations, the team found that ozone depletion in the upper atmosphere – between 35 and 45 kilometres above the ground – has slowed since 1997.

#### D. Ozone hole threat to the ecosystem is exaggerated – Planktons prove, and very little of the ocean is exposed.

Environment and Nature, February 17, 2k, Oceans resistant to ozone hole?, http://www.abc.net.au/science/news/enviro/EnviroRepublish\_101184.htm

The food basket of the Southern Oceans - its plankton population - may not have been dealt such a severe blow by soaring ultraviolet (UV-B) light levels as previously thought. In recent years the ocean has been bombarded with high levels of UV light getting in through the hole in the ozone layer, which normally shields our planet from damaging UV rays. Now Californian researchers reporting in New Scientist magazine have modelled what would have happened to phytoplankton levels before and after the hole appeared. The "before" picture was based on data from 1978, when there was no hole to speak of, and "after" taken from 1992 when the ozone hole was near as large as it has been. Phytoplankton is crucial to sustaining all ocean life. It is the first link in the food chain, turning energy from the sun into a primary food source through photosynthesis. The Californian team, led by Kevin Arrigo of Stanford University, modeled phytoplankton growth using a computer. He took into account the position of the ozone hole, cloud cover, and UV-B strength. When phytoplankton growth was compared between 1978 and 1992, the researchers found that over the southern hemisphere ecosystem as a whole, primary phytoplankton production decreased by only about one per cent, which is significantly lower than other estimates. Previous studies had shown that higher UV-B levels can stunt phytoplankton growth by 10 per cent or more in localised areas or in the laboratory (New Scientist, 8 August 1998). The difference is that his study looked at the big picture of UV-B for the whole ocean. Arrigo suggests that cloud cover may be an important factor. "On a cloudy day under a deep hole, there's still not nearly as much UV flux as on a clear day with no hole." It may also be that around 80 per cent of the southern hemisphere's ozone hole is over ice most of the time, so only a small part of the ocean is exposed to the impact of ozone depletion.

# 1NR

#### . NEW NUCLEAR STATES NOT UNSTABLE: [4 REASONS//wyo-tjc]

(1) PROLIF SLOWS ARMS RACES

(2) UNSTABLE GOVERNMENTS UNLIKELY TO BUILD WEAPONS

(3) NO REASON TO USE

(4) DOMESTIC USE WON’T CAUSE ESCALATION

Waltz in ‘3

[Kenneth N., Genius & Adjunct Professor, Columbia University, Professor Emeritus, UC-Berkeley, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, with Scott D. Sagan, p. 10-11.

What are the principal worries? Because of the importance of controlling nuclear weapons - of keeping them firmly in the hands of reliable officials - rulers of nuclear states may become more authoritarian and ever more given to secrecy. Moreover, some potential nuclear states are not politically strong and stable enough to ensure control of the weapons and control of the decision to use them. If neighboring, hostile, unstable states are armed with nuclear weapons, each will fear attack by the other. Feelings of insecurity may lead to arms races that subordinate civil needs to military necessities. Fears are compounded by the danger of internal coups, in which the control of nuclear weapons may be the main object and the key to political power. Under these fearful circumstances, it may be impossible to maintain governmental authority and civil order. The legitimacy of the state and the loyalty of its citizenry may dissolve because the state is no longer thought to be capable of maintaining external security and internal order. The first fear is that states become tyrannical; the second, that they lose control. Both fears may be realized either in different states or in the same state at different times. What can one say? Four things primarily. First, possession of nuclear weapons may slow arms races down, rather than speed them up, a possibility considered later. Second, for less-developed countries to build nuclear arsenals requires a long lead time. Nuclear weapons require administrative and technical teams able to formulate and sustain programs of considerable cost that pay off only in the long run. The more unstable a government, the shorter the attention span of its leaders. They have to deal with today's problems and hope for the best tomorrow. Governments may come and go in unpredictable fashion, but unless a minimum of continuity is maintained, nuclear programs cannot be sustained. Beneath what may be a chaotic political surface, a potential nuclear country must have a certain social-political equilibrium. Third, although highly unstable states are unlikely to initiate nuclear projects, such projects, begun in stable times, may continue through periods of political turmoil and succeed in producing nuclear weapons. A nuclear state may be unstable or may become so. But what is hard to comprehend is why, in an internal struggle for power, the contenders would start using nuclear weapons. Who would they aim at? How would they use them as instruments for maintaining or gaining control? I see little more reason to fear that one faction or another in a less-developed country will fire atomic weapons in a struggle for political power than that they will be'used in a crisis of succession. One or another nuclear state will experience uncertainty of succession, fierce struggles for power, and instability of regime. Those who fear the worst have not shown how those events might lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Strikingly, during the Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976, one group or another managed to keep control of China's nuclear weapons. One can hardly imagine a greater instability than the chaos the Cultural Revolution inflicted on China for a decade. Fourth, the possibility of one side in a civil war firing a nuclear warhead at its opponent's stronghold nevertheless remains. Such an act would produce a national tragedy, not an international one. This question then arises: Once the weapon is fired, what happens next? The domestic use of nuclear weapons is, of all the uses imaginable, least likely to lead to escalation and to global tragedy.

#### RISK OF ESCALATION IN THE PARADOX CUTS BOTH WAYS, MAKING IT EXCEEDINGLY UNLIKELY THAT NEW NUCLEAR STATES WILL ATTEMPT TO ALTER THE STATUS QUO

Alagappa in ‘8

[Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow at East-West Center, “Reinforcing National Security and Regional Stability”, in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. M. Alagappa, P. 519//wyo-tjc]

Reviewing the Cold War experience, Robert Jervis has argued that nuclear weapons strengthen the status quo. However, he qualified that assertion by excluding situations where the status quo is ambiguous or when a revisionist power has the power to implement threats, has high resolve, and sees the domestic and international situations as precarious enough to merit great risk and cost (Jervis 1989: 32—34). Along these lines but in a more detailed fashion, Paul Kapur (2006) argues that nuclear weapons may provide incentives for a weaker, revisionist state to engage in limited conventional military action to alter the status quo. Such a state would not engage in aggressive behavior in a conventional world because it would most likely result in failure. In a nuclear world, the stronger state is inhibited from employing its full military might for fear that hostilities would escalate to nuclear war. This risk of escalation emboldens a highly motivated state to behave aggressively. In this study, I argue that the risk of escalation cuts both ways and that the net effect of nuclear weapons has been to reinforce the status quo and enhance stability in the Asian security region in two ways: they make change through violence more difficult arid highly costly; and they dramatically increase the political cost of “adventurist” behavior by nuclear weapon states. The limit to forcefully alter the status quo and the associated political risks disadvantage the challenger and help entrench the status quo. These points are best illustrated by the India—Pakistan case. They are also evident in a limited manner in the conflict across the Taiwan Strait.

#### TERRORIST ACQUISITION IS SO UNLIKELY AS TO BE A FICTION—STATES WOULD NEVER TRANSFER WEAPONS AND STEALING THEM IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT

Kapur in ‘8

[S. Paul, Associate Professor of Strategic Research at United States Naval War College, “Nuclear Terrorism: Prospects in Asia”, in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. M. Alagappa, p. 324-325//wyo-tjc]

If a terrorist group’s goal can be advanced by the use of nuclear weapons, it would still need to meet a second important requirement: it would need to acquire a nuclear capability in the first place. It could do so either by procuring an intact weapon or by producing one. Terrorists could procure an intact weapon in two different ways. First, a nuclear state could voluntarily transfer a weapon to terrorists for use against a designated enemy. This could enable the state to inflict massive damage on the enemy while maintaining deniability and potentially avoiding retaliation (Ferguson and Potter 2004: 55—57). This occurrence, however, is unlikely. In this “transfer” scenario, the nuclear state would lose control of the weapon in question, forcing it to place enormous trust in the terrorists’ loyalty and judgment. It is doubtful that a nuclear state’s leaders would be willing to trust a terrorist organization to this degree (Feiguson and Pottei 2004 57 Glaser and Fetter 2001) Terrorist groups could also acquire an intact weapon by stealing it from a nuclear state This would be an extremely difficult feat even for sophisticated terrorist groups. Nuclear weapons are protected by the most robust security measures that nation—states can devise. Protective measures include programs to ensure the reliability of the personnel in charge of weapons extensive physical barriers including location in heavily guarded, often isolated military bases; electronic systems to prevent unauthorized weapons use; and storage of the fissile core separate from the rest of the weapon. According to Ferguson and Potter, in the absence of significant insider assistance, theft of a nuclear weapon by terrorists is probably better described as “the stuff of fiction than a practicable approach for a terrorist organization.” Even in the event of inside help or major political unrest within a nuclear weapon state, terrorist theft of an intact nuclear device would be difficult and unlikely (Bunn, Holdren, and Wier 2002: 5; Ferguson and Potter 2004: 57—65,119).

#### ASIAN PROLIFERATION IS STABLE—ARSENALS WILL BE SMALL, SURVIVABLE AND STABLE. ALL THE CONDITIONS SAGAN REFERENCES DON’T OBTAIN

Cha in ‘1

[Victor, Assoc. Professor of Government at Georgetown, “The second nuclear age: Proliferation pessimism versus sober optimism in South Asia and East Asia”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Dec. 2001//wyo-tjc]

These arguments also fail to comprehend how the bipolar superpower experience has greatly prejudiced our thinking on nuclear deterrence and stability. As Goldstein notes, the conventional wisdom demonstrates an insufficient appreciation of the uniqueness rather than generalizability of the superpower experience.78 For example, organizational arguments assume that the profile of the Asian programs as small and underdeveloped make them more prone to accidents, 'loose nukes', or inadvertent use. However, if the arsenals are small in size and few in number, they are, as a general rule, easier to monitor and control. In addition, many of the organizational pathologies made famous by Sagan require complexity in the nuclear infrastructure and decision-making trees - a precondition that is irrelevant in Asia because the infrastructures are basic and in many cases, divorced from the military bureaucracy (another pathology often mentioned).79 In a similar vein, poor command, control, and communications infrastructures in Asia empirically have not resulted in 'use-or-lose' mentalities but have bred more caution (e.g. Indo-Pakistan conflicts). Limited overhead and reconnaissance capabilities have not encouraged confidence in the ability to hide one's arsenals but have discouraged confidence in carrying out successful first strikes. In addition, many of these small fledgling programs, by virtue of resource constraints, remain at underdeveloped stages (i.e., dealerted, de-targeting, disassembled weapons systems, separated warheads from delivery vehicles).80 Therefore, until an accident or outcome confirms the organizational school's view in the second nuclear age, and given what is now being unearthed about the near-misses and near-disasters in the first nuclear age, there is no a priori reason to assume a necessary causal connection between small programs and de-stabilizing outcomes.

#### THIS IS KEY TO ELIMINATE OFFENSIVE FORCE POSTURES THAT GUARANTEE INEVITABLE MAJOR POWER WARS\*\*

Alagappa in ‘8

[Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow at East-West Center, “Introduction”, in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. M. Alagappa, P. 26//wyo-tjc]

 Second, the study posits that nuclear weapons have contributed to the security of states and reinforced stability in the Asian security region that is underpinned by several pillars. Although there could be some destabilizing consequences, thus far nuclear weapons have not undermined stability in Asia. In fact, they have contributed to stability by assuaging national security concerns, preventing the outbreak of major wars, strengthening the status quo, increasing deterrence dominance, and reinforcing the trend in the region toward a reduction in the salience of force in international politics. For a number of reasons (acceptance of the political and territorial status quo; increase in the political, diplomatic, and economic cost of using force in a situation of complex interdependence; and the impracticability of resolving conflicts through the use of force) the offensive roles of force have been on the decline in Asia. Nuclear weapons reinforce this trend by enhancing deter- rence dominance and making the cost of war among nuclear weapon states cata- strophic and prohibitive, especially in a situation of complex interdependence.

#### FIRST, IRANIAN PROLIF FORCES ISRAELI DISCLOSURE AND THE END TO STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY

Dan Williams, staff, **2006**, Reuters, Israel Seen Lifting Nuclear Veil in Iran Stand-Off", Sept. 25, 2006, p. online

With Israel's current arch-foe Iran seen gaining the ability to produce nuclear weapons within a few years, and preventive military options limited, some experts now anticipate another "lifting of the veil" on the assumed Israeli atomic arsenal. Were that to happen, experts say, the objective would be to establish a more open military deterrence vis-a-vis Iran and perhaps win Israel's nuclear option formal legitimacy abroad. "No one should simply assume that Israel would stay where it is now with its ambiguous capability if Iran becomes a nuclear power," said Professor Gerald Steinberg, head of the Conflict Management Programme at Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv. "Israeli policy is likely to change, in order to demonstrate that the country has continued strategic superiority," he said. Israel neither confirms nor denies it has the Middle East's only nuclear weapons, under an "ambiguity" policy billed as warding off enemy states while avoiding a regional arms race. Steinberg said this might be abandoned only as a last resort to persuade a nuclear-armed Iran that it stood to suffer far greater devastation in any full-blown future conflict.

#### SECOND, ISRAELI DISCLOSURE GOOD-- DISCLOSING CAPABILITIES AND COUNTER-VALUE THREATS KEY TO DETERRENCE AND STOPPING NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Beres in ‘7

[Louis Rene, Professor at Purdue, "Israel's Uncertain Strategic Future", Parameters, Spring, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

The rationale for Israeli nuclear disclosure does not lie in expressing the obvious; that Israel has the bomb. Instead, it lies in the informed understanding that nuclear weapons can serve the nation’s security in a number of ways, all of which may be of benefit depending on the extent to which certain aspects of these weapons and the associated strategies are disclosed. The pertinent form and extent of disclosure is vital to Israeli nuclear deterrence. To protect itself against enemy strikes, particularly those carrying existential costs, Israel needs to exploit every component of its nuclear arsenal. The success of Israel’s efforts will depend in largemeasure not only upon its chosen configuration of “counterforce” (hard-target) and “counter-value” (city-busting) operations, but also upon the extent towhich this configuration is known in advance by enemy states. Before an enemy is deterred from launching first-strikes against Israel or fromlaunching retaliatory attacks following an Israeli preemption, it may not be enough to simply “know” that Israel has the bomb. Potential enemies need to recognize that Israeli nuclear weapons are sufficiently invulnerable to attack and they are aimed at highvalue targets. In this context, the Final Report of Project Daniel recommends that “a recognizable retaliatory force should be fashioned with the capacity to destroy some 15 high-value targets scattered widely over pertinent enemy states in the Middle East.” This counter-value strategy means that Israel’s second-strike response to enemy aggressions involving certain biological or nuclear weapons would be unambiguously directed at enemy populations, not at enemy weapons or infrastructures. Itmay appear, at first glance, that Israeli targeting of enemy military installations and troop concentrations (counterforce targeting) would be both more compelling as a deterrent and also more humane. But it is entirely likely that a nuclear-armed enemy could conceivably regard any Israeli retaliatory destruction of its armed forces as “acceptable” in certain circumstances. Such an enemy may even conclude that the expected benefits of annihilating “the Zionist entity” outweigh any expected retaliatory harms to itsmilitary.Under such circumstances, Israel’s nuclear deterrent would fail, possibly with existential consequences. It is highly unlikely, however, that any enemy state would ever calculate that the expected benefits of annihilating Israel would outweigh the expected costs of its own annihilation. Excluding an irrational actor—a prospect that falls outside the logic of nuclear deterrence—enemies of Israel would assuredly refrain from nuclear or biological attacks that would presumptively elicit massive counter-value reprisals. This reasoning holds only to the extent that these enemies fully believe that Israel will make good on its announced strategy. Israel’s nuclear deterrent, once it were made explicit, would need to state to all prospective nuclear enemies: “Israel’s nuclear weapons, dispersed, multiplied, and hardened, are targeted upon your major cities. These weaponswill never be used against these targets except in retaliation for certainWMD aggressions. Unless our population centers are struck first by nuclear attack, certain levels of biological attack, or by combined nuclear and biological attack, we will not harm your cities.” Some readers may be disturbed by this reasoning, discovering in it perhaps an ominous hint of “Dr. Strangelove.” Yet, the counter-value targeting strategy recommended by Project Daniel represents Israel’s best hope for avoiding nuclear or biological warfare. It is the most humane strategy available. The Israeli alternative, an expressed counterforce targeting doctrine, would produce a higher probability of nuclear or nuclear/biological war. Such a war, even if all weapons remained targeted on the enemy’s military forces and structures (an optimistic assumption) would almost certainly entail higher levels of collateral damage. The very best weapons, Clausewitz wrote, are those that achieve their objectives without ever actually being used. This is certainly the case with nuclear weapons. Israel’s nuclear weapons can only succeed through their non-use. ProjectDanielmade clear in its Final Report to PrimeMinister Sharon that nuclear war-fighting must always be avoided. The Project Daniel Group recommends that Israel take whatever actions are necessary to prevent enemy nuclearization, up to and including certain acts of preemption. Should these measures fail (measures that are permissible under international law as expressions of “anticipatory selfdefense”), the State of Israel should immediately end its posture of nuclear ambiguity with open declarations of counter-value targeting. In fact, Prime Minister Olmert’s commentary on Israel’s nuclear capacity indicates that such declarations may not be far off.

#### NUCLEAR WEAPONS STABILIZE SOUTH ASIA—ADDRESS PAKI SECURITY CONCERNS

Waltz in ‘95

[Kenneth N., Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons, August 1995, [http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/wak01/#txt\*](http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/wak01/#txt*)//wyo-tjc]

States do what they can, to paraphrase Thucydides, and they suffer what they must. Nuclear weapons do not increase what states can do offensively; they do greatly increase what they may suffer should their actions prompt retaliation by others. Thus, far from contributing to instability in South Asia, Pakistan's nuclear military capability, along with India's, limits the provocative acts of both countries and provides a sense of security to them. Recalling Pakistan's recent history of military rule and the initiation of war, some have expected the opposite. For a more reasoned view we might listen to two of the participants. When asked recently why nuclear weapons are so popular in Pakistan, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto answered: "It's our history. A history of three wars with a larger neighbor. India is five times larger than we are. Their military strength is five times larger. In 1971, our country was disintegrated. So the security issue for Pakistan is an issue of survival." 23 From the other side, Shankar Bajpai, former Indian Ambassador to Pakistan, China, and the United States, has said that "Pakistan's quest for a nuclear capability stems from its fear of its larger neighbor, removing that fear should open up immense possibilities"--possibilities for a less worried and more relaxed life. 24 Exactly.

#### SECOND, THERE’S NO RISK OF ESCALATION TO A LARGER WAR EVEN IF IT GOES NUCLEAR.

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For those who do not live in the subcontinent, the most important fact is that the damage would be largely confined to the region. The Cold War is over, the strategic understandings that once tied India and Pakistan to the rival alliance systems have all been cancelled, and no outside powers would be drawn into the fighting. The detonation of a hundred or so relatively small nuclear weapons over India and Pakistan would not cause grave harm to the wider world from fallout. People over 40 have already lived through a period when the great powers conducted hundreds of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and they are mostly still here.